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In extant quantum secret sharing protocols, once the secret is shared in a quantum network (qnet)
it cannot be retrieved, even if the dealer wishes that his/her secret no longer be available in the
network. For instance, if the dealer is part of two qnets, say Q1 and Q2 and he/she subsequently
finds that Q2 is more reliable than Q1, he/she may wish to transfer all her secrets from Q1 to Q2.
Known protocols are inadequate to address such a revocation. In this work we address this problem
by designing a protocol that enables the source/dealer to bring back the information shared in the
network, if desired. Unlike classical revocation, the no-cloning theorem automatically ensures that
the secret is no longer shared in the network.
The implications of our results are multi-fold. One interesting implication of our technique is the
possibility of routing qubits in asynchronous qnets. By asynchrony we mean that the requisite
data/resources are intermittently available (but not necessarily simultaneously) in the qnet. For
example, we show that a source S can send quantum information to a destination R even though
(a) S and R share no quantum resource, (b) R’s identity is unknown to S at the time of sending the
message, but is subsequently decided, (c) S herself can be R at a later date and/or in a different
location to bequeath her information (‘backed-up’ in the qnet) and (d) importantly, the path chosen
for routing the secret may hit a dead end due to resource constraints, congestion, etc., (therefore
the information needs to be back-tracked and sent along an alternate path). Another implication of
our technique is the possibility of using insecure resources. For instance, if the quantum memory
within an organization is insufficient, it may safely store (using our protocol) its private information
with a neighboring organization without (a) revealing critical data to the host and (b) losing control
over retrieving the data.
Putting the two implications together, namely routing and secure storage, it is possible to envision
applications like quantum mail (qmail) as an outsourced service.
PACS numbers:
Quantum entanglement [1] not only gives us insight
into understanding the deepest nature of reality but also
acts as a very useful resource in carrying out various in-
formation processing protocols like quantum teleporta-
tion [2, 3], quantum cryptography [4] and quantum secret
sharing(QSS) [5], to name a few.
In a secret sharing protocol the sender/dealer of the se-
cret message, who is unaware of the individual honesty of
the receivers, shares the secret in such a way that none of
the receivers get any information about the secret. QSS
[5, 6] deals with the problem of sharing of both classi-
cal and quantum secrets. A typical protocol for quan-
tum secret sharing, like many other tasks in quantum
cryptography, uses entanglement as a cardinal resource,
mostly pure entangled states. Karlsson et al. [7] studied
QSS protocols using bipartite pure entangled states as re-
sources. Many authors investigated the concept of QSS
using tripartite pure entangled states and multi-partite
states like graph states [8–14]. Li et al. [15] proposed
semi-quantum secret sharing protocols taking maximally
entangled GHZ state as resource.
In a realistic situation, the secret sharing of classical
or quantum information involves transmission of qubits
through noisy channels that entails mixed states. Re-
cently in [16], it is shown that QSS is possible with bi-
partite two-qubit mixed states (formed due to noisy en-
vironment or otherwise). Subsequently in [17] authors
propose a protocol for secret sharing of classical infor-
mation with three-qubit mixed state. Quantum secret
sharing has also been realized in experiments [18–21].
In QSS, it is typically assumed that the system consists
of solely the dealer and the receivers. However, in prac-
tical settings the dealer/receivers are part of a quantum
network. One important question of how information can
be transferred through a quantum network is addressed
in [22–26]. In this work we focus on two different situ-
ations in a given quantum network (qnet). In the first
situation, we consider the problem of revoking the secret
in QSS. For instance, if the dealer finds the receivers to
be dishonest, she can stop them from accessing it. More-
over, she may choose to retrieve the secret completely.
In our model we consider the receivers to be semi-honest
– that is, the receivers, though dishonest to eavesdrop
on their share and process it, diligently participate in
the protocol. On the other hand, note that Byzantinely
malicious receivers can easily destroy the secret, making
revocation impossible. In the second situation we have
extended the above idea to design routing mechanism for
multi-hop transmission of secret qubits in the shared do-
main itself.
Although the above two situations appear to solve
unrelated problems namely, revocable secret sharing
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2and quantum routing, the following is an interesting
symbiosis of the two to solve problems posed by resource
constraints and asynchrony in the network. Consider
a situation where quantum storage is constrained and
therefore Alice needs to store her private data in some
(probably untrustworthy) memory available in the
network. This she can do using revocable QSS. Further,
if she wants to send these data to Bob (for security
reasons) she should be able to do it without reconstruct-
ing the quantum secret anywhere in the network. This
she can achieve using the quantum routing in shared
domain. Incidentally, our solution also takes care of
scenarios where Bob too is in short supply of trusted
quantum memory and uses network storage.
Sharing of a Message :
First of all, we consider a simple situation where we
have three parties Alice, Bob and Charlie. They
share a three-qubit maximally entangled GHZ state, i.e.,
|GHZ〉ABC = 1√2 (|000〉 + |111〉). Here the first qubit is
with Alice, second is with Bob and the third one is with
Charlie. Here Alice is the dealer and she wishes to secret-
share a qubit |S〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉 (where |α|2+|β|2 = 1; α, β
are amplitudes) with both the parties Bob and Charlie.
In order to do so Alice has to do two-qubit measure-
ments in Bell basis {|φ±〉, |ψ±〉} jointly on her resource
qubit and the message qubit she wants to share (see Ap-
pendix 1). In correspondence with various measurement
outcomes obtained by Alice, Bob and Charlie’s qubits
collapse into the states given in TABLE 1.
TABLE I: Sharing of Quantum Information
Alice’s Measurement
Outcomes
Bob and Charlie’s Combined
State
|φ+〉 α|00〉+ β|11〉
|φ−〉 α|00〉 − β|11〉
|ψ+〉 α|11〉+ β|00〉
|ψ−〉 α|11〉 − β|00〉
At this point if Alice finds both Bob and Charlie
to be dishonest, she can stop them from accessing the
message. She does this by not communicating about
her measurement results to any one of them. So there
is no transfer of classical bits at this stage. At this
point there lies the question of security from Bob and
Charlie sides. If we have malicious (parties who are
not going to follow the protocol and do whatever they
wish to do) Bob and Charlie can destroy the message
by doing local operations in their respective qubits and
by communicating classically between them. However,
they will never be successful in obtaining the message
without Alice’s help.
Revocation of Quantum Information :
If Bob and Charlie are semi-honest (i.e., they are faith-
ful executors of the protocol but curious to learn Alice’s
secret), we ask can Alice revoke her shared secret |S〉?
The ability to revoke the shared secret is important for
several reasons, some of which are (a) Alice decides to
change her secret (for instance, |S〉 might have been in-
advertently shared), (b) Alice conjectures that the recip-
ients are no longer trustworthy, (c) there is an update of
data/secrets in the higher-level application using secret
sharing as a subroutine and (d) Alice has found a more
economical alternative qnet to safeguard |S〉
To make the revocation possible Alice needs an addi-
tional resource (a Bell state) shared with Bob. Consider
a very simple case when Alice and Bob are sharing the
Bell state |Bell〉AB = 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉) in addition to the
GHZ state shared by Alice, Bob and Charlie. Let us also
assume the first case in the above TABLE 1, when Bob
and Charlie share the entangled state α|00〉+ β|11〉 as a
result of Alice’s measurement. Now Alice asks Bob to do
Bell measurement on his two qubits (one from the shared
resource and one from shared secret) and Charlie to do
measurement (on his qubit of shared secret) in Hadamard
basis (see Appendix 2, see FIG. 1). In TABLE 2 we
show how Alice can retrieve back her message by enlist-
ing down the respective local operations corresponding
to Bob’s and Charlie’s measurement outcomes. It can be
observed that the Revocation needs Alice to share an ad-
ditional resource (a Bell state) with at least one of Bob or
Charlie. In case if Alice shares a Bell state with Charlie,
Charlie will first do Bell measurement on his two qubits
and then Bob will do measurement in Hadamard basis on
his qubit. In either case Alice can retrieve her message
by performing the respective local operations.
A
B
C
A
B
C
FIG. 1: Figure on the left side indicates a three-qubit GHZ
state (depicted by a triangle) shared among Alice(A),
Bob(B) and Charlie(C) and a two-qubit Bell state shared
between and Alice(A) and Bob(B). Alice is also having the
secret (depicted by an isolated dot) with herself. The figure
on the right describes the situation after Alice’s
measurement, where both Bob and Charlie are sharing the
secret between them (the dotted line).
3TABLE II: Retrieving Quantum Information
Bob’s
Outcomes
Charlie’s
Outcomes
Alice’s
Resultant
state
Alice’s Local
Operations
|φ+〉 |+〉 α|0〉+ β|1〉 I
|φ+〉 |−〉 α|0〉 − β|1〉 σz
|φ−〉 |+〉 α|0〉 − β|1〉 σz
|φ−〉 |−〉 α|0〉+ β|1〉 I
|ψ+〉 |+〉 β|0〉+ α|1〉 σx
|ψ+〉 |−〉 α|1〉 − β|0〉 σxσz
|ψ−〉 |+〉 β|0〉 − α|1〉 σxσz
|ψ−〉 |−〉 α|1〉+ β|0〉 σx
For example, suppose Alice shares additional resource
with Bob and Bob gets |ψ−〉 as outcome of Bell mea-
surement and Charlie gets |+〉 as outcome of her mea-
surement in Hadamard basis. From Appendix 2, it is
clear that Alice will have α|1〉 − β|0〉 as result of these
measurements.
Now, from TABLE 2, Alice needs to apply σxσz on
her part, i.e., σxσz(α|1〉−β|0〉) = α|0〉+β|1〉 to complete
the revocation.
Quantum Routing in shared domain :
If Alice has shared her secret qubit |S〉 in some part
of a (huge) qnet, we ask can she/anyone else retrieve
|S〉 at some other part of the network ? A naive way
out is to reconstruct |S〉 and teleport it, possibly via suc-
cessive entanglement swapping. However, this severely
compromises the security of |S〉. A superior approach
is to retain |S〉 in the shared domain, while the shares
are being routed across the qnet. However, since the
shares are themselves entangled and distributed across
multiple parties, it is non-trivial to teleport them over
the qnet. We address the problem in two parts. First,
we show its possible for Alice to dynamically choose the
receiver (of her secret), after the sharing phase. Second,
we show that quantum information can be transmitted
in the shared domain: that is, the information secret
shared among a set of nodes is transferred to another set
of nodes. Putting the two together, Alice can now move
her shared secret close to the desired receiver in the qnet
and also remotely control the reconstruction of the secret
at the receiver.
Consider a situation where we have (3 + n) parties.
Here Alice is the sender, both Charlie and Bob act as
agents, the remaining n parties {R1, R2, R3, . . . , Rn}
are the potential receivers. Alice desires to send the
message in form of a qubit to any one of them. Here the
role of Bob and Charlie is changed as they are no longer
receivers of information but they now act as agents for
holding the information in the network. In broader sense
they together act like a router and play a vital role in
sending the information to the desired receiver.
Once again we start with Alice, Bob and Charlie
sharing a three-qubit maximally entangled GHZ state,
i.e., |GHZ〉ABC = 1√2 (|000〉 + |111〉) and Charlie shares
Bell’s states, i.e., |Bell〉CRi = 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉) with
each of the receivers (Ri). (In principle, receivers can
share resource with any one of the agents Bob and
Charlie. Without any loss of generality we assume the
receivers share resources with Charlie only.) Suppose
Alice wishes to send a qubit |S〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 to Ri
through the parties Bob and Charlie. First Alice shares
her secret with Bob and Charlie in the same way as
it is shown in the (TABLE 1). At this point, Alice
sends her measurement outcomes encoded in the form
of two classical bits to Ri. Once the two bits of classical
information are obtained, the receiver can easily get
back the Alice’s secret |S〉, provided Bob and Charlie
perform the actions as described next. We assume that
the identity of the receiver is authentically known to
Alice, Bob and Charlie, perhaps through a classically
secure authentication/identification protocol.
A
B
C
R1R2R3
Rn
FIG. 2: Any one of the n receivers {R1, R2, R3, . . . , Rn}
which individually share Bell states with Charlie can
reconstruct the secret.
The agents Bob and Charlie do the following. Bob
measures his qubit (part of the GHZ state) in the
Hadamard basis. Charlie measures two qubits (one from
GHZ state and one from Bell state shared with Ri) in
the Bell basis. After performing these measurements
both the agents will send their outcomes through classi-
cal channels to the receiver Ri. With these measurement
outcomes the receiver can retrieve the message which Al-
ice intended to send (see Appendix 3, see FIG 2). Let us
consider the case, when Alice and Bob share the entan-
gled state α|00〉 + β|11〉, obtained as a result of Alice’s
measurement. TABLE 3 gives an elaborate view of the
4S
A1 A2 A3 An
B1 B2 B3 Bn
R1 R2 R3 Rn
FIG. 3: A typical quantum mail sending network where S is
the source, (Ai, Bi) are the agents and Ri are the receivers.
Initially, the information is shared between the pairs
(A1, B1) (the dotted line) and will be transferred to other
pairs until the pair close to the desired receiver is reached.
The information is moved along
(A1, B1), (B1, A2), (A2, B2), (B2, A3) and so on till (An, Bn)
as shown with gray dotted lines.
unitary operations the receiver Ri has to do upon getting
various measurement outcomes from Bob and Charlie.
TABLE III: Sending Quantum Information
Charlie’s
Outcome
Bob’s Outcome
Unitary
operations of Ri
|φ+〉 |+〉 I
|φ−〉 |+〉 σz
|φ+〉 |−〉 σz
|φ−〉 |−〉 I
|ψ+〉 |+〉 σx
|ψ−〉 |+〉 σzσx
|ψ+〉 |−〉 σzσx
|ψ−〉 |−〉 σx
Finally, we address the problem of transferring secret
qubits in the shared domain till it comes close to the
desired receiver. If we have a source (S) and receivers
R1, R2, . . . , Rn and we want to send the information to
the receiver Ri through a huge network with pair of
agents (A1, B1), (A2, B2), . . . , (An, Bn) at each blocks,
every pair shares Bell state with consecutive pair say
Ai with Ai+1 and Bi with Bi+1. The above setting is
depicted in FIG. 3. Once the source shares the informa-
tion with ith pair the information can be transferred to
(i + 1)th pair by the process of entanglement swapping
in the following way. Ai performs the Bell measurement
on two qubits one from the shared secret and other from
the Bell state shared with Ai+1, similarly Bi performs
the Bell measurement on two qubits one from the shared
secret and other from the Bell state shared with Bi+1
(See Appendix 4). This sequence of measurements
goes on till the closest pair gets the shared secret. The
classical outcomes of each measurement are sent to Alice
immediately after the measurement to keep track of the
state of the shared secret. The receivers can stay in the
network in between each pairs. The source is not going
to send the classical information until the quantum
information (shared secret) reaches the pair (Ai, Bi)
close to the desired receiver. Thus, in a qnet we can
share, retrieve, hold and as well as transfer the quantum
information.
Security Analysis:
In this work, we look at QSS as sharing of quan-
tum information with semi-honest participants. By
semi-honest, we mean (i) the participants are eager
to know any information about the secret without
violating the rules of the protocol, (ii) the participants
are not allowed to bring ancillary states and perform
measurements along with the states involved in the
protocol.
For the Revocation protocol, we do security analysis at
different stages: (a) Once the secret is shared by protocol
given in [4], what is the chance of Bob and/or Charlie
getting the secret |ψ〉? (b) During reconstruction, what
is the chance of Charlie getting the secret once Bob has
done with his Bell measurement? (c) After the revocation
protocol, can Bob and Charlie guess in together what is
the secret shared?
Further for reconstruction of the secret at different re-
ceiver Ri (FIG. 2) we ask the question (d) if Ri is dishon-
est, what is the chance that Ri will have the information
about the secret after Charlie’s measurement.
It is to be noted that the most important part of the
protocol is to keep as secret, the classical information
of Alice’s measurement outcome. In particular, if the
classical information is known to other parties having
shares, the secret is revealed. Now it remains interest-
ing to see how much information rest of the parties can
obtain about the shared quantum state without having
access to the classical information. It is intuitive that the
information about the shared quantum state is present
in the reduced density matrix of the information seekers.
We answer all the above questions by looking at the re-
duced density operator of the corresponding subsystem
and we show that it has no dependence on the actual
secret |ψ〉.
To answer (a), consider the density operator of the
system given in Appendix 1 as
ρ =
1
4
{|φ+〉〈φ+|(α|00〉+ β|11〉)(α∗〈00|+ β∗〈11|)
+ |φ−〉〈φ−|(α|00〉 − β|11〉)(α∗〈00| − β∗〈11|)
+ |ψ+〉〈ψ+|(α|11〉+ β|00〉)(α∗〈11 + β∗〈00|)
+ |ψ−〉〈ψ−|(α|11〉 − β|00〉)(α∗〈11| − β∗〈00|)}.
5Tracing out Alice’s two-qubit system, the reduced den-
sity operator of Bob and Charlie’s system is given by,
ρBC =
1
4
{(α|00〉+ β|11〉)(α∗〈00|+ β∗〈11|)
+ (α|00〉 − β|11〉)(α∗〈00| − β∗〈11|)
+ (α|11〉+ β|00〉)(α∗〈11|+ β∗〈00|)
+ (α|11〉 − β|00〉)(α∗〈11| − β∗〈00|)}
=
1
2
{|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|}.
Clearly, we see that ρBC is independent of the secret
|ψ〉. In other words, it is independent of the information
parameter α.
To answer (b), we consider the entire initial system as
1√
2
(α|0〉 + β|1〉)(|000〉 + |111〉). After Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement the density operator of the entire system
becomes
ρ1 =
1
8
{|φ+〉(|+〉(α|0〉+ β|1〉) + |−〉(α|0〉 − β|1〉))
+ |φ−〉(|+〉(α|0〉 − β|1〉) + |−〉(α|0〉+ β|1〉))
+ |ψ+〉(|+〉(α|1〉+ β|0〉)− |−〉(α|1〉 − β|0〉))
+ |ψ−〉(|+〉(α|1〉 − β|0〉)− |−〉(α|1〉+ β|0〉))}
{〈φ+|(〈+|(α〈0|+ β〈1|) + 〈−|(α〈0| − β〈1|))
+ 〈φ−|(〈+|(α〈0| − β〈1|) + 〈−|(α〈0|+ β〈1|))
+ 〈ψ+|(〈+|(α〈1|+ β〈0|)− 〈−|(α〈1| − β〈0|))
+ 〈ψ−|(〈+|(α〈1| − β〈0|)− 〈−|(α〈1|+ β〈0|))}.
Tracing out Alice’s and Bob’s three-qubit system, the
reduced density operator of Charlie’s system is given by,
ρC1 =
1
8
{4(|α|2 + |β|2)|0〉〈0|+ 4(|α|2 + |β|2)|1〉〈1|}
=
1
2
{|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|} = I
2
.
To answer (c), let us suppose Bob shares an additional
resource 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) with Alice. In this situation con-
sider the entire initial system as 12 (α|0〉+β|1〉)A0(|000〉+|111〉)A1B1C1(|00〉 + |11〉)A2B2 . After Alice’s, Bob’s and
Charlie’s respective measurements of the revocation pro-
tocol the density operator of the entire system becomes
ρ2 =
1
32 |Q〉〈Q| where,
|Q〉A0A1A2B1B2C1
= {|φ+〉|s+〉[|φ+〉|+〉+ |φ−〉|−〉] + |φ+〉|s−〉[|φ−〉|−〉+ |φ−〉|+〉]
+ |φ+〉|r+〉[|ψ+〉|+〉 − |ψ−〉|−〉] + |φ+〉|r−〉[|ψ+〉|−〉 − |ψ−〉|+〉]
+ |φ−〉|s+〉[|φ−〉|+〉 − |φ+〉|−〉] + |φ−〉|s−〉[|φ+〉|+〉+ |φ−〉|−〉]
+ |φ−〉|r+〉[|ψ+〉|−〉 − |ψ−〉|+〉] + |φ−〉|r−〉[|ψ+〉|+〉 − |ψ−〉|−〉]
+ |ψ+〉|s+〉[|ψ+〉|+〉+ |ψ−〉|−〉]− |ψ+〉|s−〉[|ψ+〉|−〉+ |ψ−〉|+〉]
+ |ψ+〉|r+〉[|φ+〉|+〉+ |φ−〉|−〉]− |ψ+〉|r−〉[|φ+〉|−〉+ |φ−〉|+〉]
− |ψ−〉|s+〉[|ψ+〉|+〉+ |ψ−〉|+〉] + |ψ−〉|s−〉[|ψ+〉|+〉+ |ψ−〉|−〉]
− |ψ−〉|r+〉[|φ+〉|−〉+ |φ−〉|+〉] + |ψ−〉|r−〉[|φ+〉|+〉+ |φ−〉|−〉]}
with,
|s+〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉,
|s−〉 = α|0〉 − β|1〉,
|r+〉 = α|1〉+ β|0〉,
|r−〉 = α|1〉 − β|0〉.
Tracing out Alice’s system of three qubits corresponding
to {A0A1A2}, it is clear to see the reduced density oper-
ator of three-qubit system corresponding to {B1B2C1}
is independent of the information parameter α.
To answer (d), let us suppose Ri is the authorized
receiver sending request to Charlie and sharing a
Bell state 1√
2
{|00〉 + |11〉}CRi with him. In this
situation, we consider the entire initial system as
1
2 (α|0〉 + β|1〉)(|000〉 + |111〉)(|00〉 + |11〉). After Alice’s,
Bob’s and Charlie’s respective measurements the density
operator of the entire system becomes ρ3 =
1
32 |R〉〈R|
where
|R〉 = {|φ+〉|+〉[|φ+〉|s+〉+ |φ−〉|s−〉+ |ψ+〉|r+〉+ |ψ−〉|r−〉]
+ |φ+〉|−〉[|φ+〉|s−〉+ |φ−〉|s+〉+ |ψ+〉|r−〉+ |ψ−〉|r+〉]
+ |φ−〉|+〉[|φ+〉|s−〉+ |φ−〉|s+〉+ |ψ+〉|r−〉+ |ψ−〉|r+〉]
+ |φ−〉|−〉[|φ+〉|s+〉+ |φ−〉|s−〉+ |ψ+〉|r+〉+ |ψ−〉|r−〉]
+ |ψ+〉|+〉[|φ+〉|r+〉 − |φ−〉|r−〉+ |ψ+〉|s+〉 − |ψ−〉|s−〉]
− |ψ+〉|−〉[|φ+〉|r−〉 − |φ−〉|r+〉+ |ψ+〉|s−〉 − |ψ−〉|s+〉]
+ |ψ−〉|+〉[|φ+〉|r−〉 − |φ−〉|r+〉+ |ψ+〉|s−〉 − |ψ−〉|s+〉]
− |ψ−〉|−〉[|φ+〉|r+〉 − |φ−〉|r−〉+ |ψ+〉|s+〉 − |ψ−〉|s−〉]},
with,
|s+〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉,
|s−〉 = α|0〉 − β|1〉,
|r+〉 = α|1〉+ β|0〉,
|r−〉 = α|1〉 − β|0〉.
6Tracing out Alice, Bob and Charlie’s five-qubit system,
the reduced density operator of Ri’s system is again,
ρRi3 =
1
32
{16(|α|2 + |β|2)|0〉〈0|+ 16(|α|2 + |β|2)|1〉〈1|}
=
1
2
{|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|} = I
2
.
So here we find that in each of these steps, the reduced
density matrix of the information seeker is independent
of the information parameter α. This clearly indicates
that with semi-honest participants at every step our
protocol is secure.
Concluding remarks and Outlook:
This paper addresses the problem of revocable quantum
secret sharing. The ability to revoke a quantum shared
secret has implications for quantum routing (including
backtracking ) in shared domain. An interesting conse-
quence of the above is that critical/private information
|S〉 can be q-mailed across public qnets, first by secret
sharing |S〉 and then routing |S〉 (in the shared domain)
to the desired receiver. We have assumed the resources
to be pure entangled states; however, working out with
resources being mixed entangled states still remains
an open question. Another direction can be of sharing
multi-partite entangled qubits and routing them to the
desired receiver. Yet another direction would be to
use the techniques of [7] to thwart attacks beyond the
semi-honest adversary [27]. Recently, cryptanalysis of
other QSS protocols has been discussed in [28, 29].
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Appendix 1:
Consider a 3-qubit GHZ state 1√
2
{|000〉+|111〉} among Alice, Bob and Charlie and let |ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 be the
message with Alice.
|ψ〉 ⊗ 1√
2
{|000〉+ |111〉}
= {α|0〉+ β|1〉} ⊗ 1√
2
{|000〉+ |111〉}
=
1√
2
{α|0000〉+ α|0111〉+ β|1000〉+ β|1111〉}
=
1√
2
{|00〉α|00〉+ |01〉α|11〉+ |10〉β|00〉+ |11〉β|11〉}
=
1
2
{[|φ+〉+ |φ−〉]α|00〉+ [|ψ+〉+ |ψ−〉]α|11〉+ [|ψ+〉 − |ψ−〉]β|00〉+ [|φ+〉 − |φ−〉]β|11〉}
=
1
2
{|φ+〉[α|00〉+ β|11〉] + |φ−〉[α|00〉 − β|11〉] + |ψ+〉[α|11〉+ β|00〉] + |ψ−〉[α|11〉 − β|00〉]} (1)
Appendix 2:
Suppose Alice and Bob share a bell state 1√
2
{|00〉+ |11〉}AB and the secret is already being shared between Bob and
Charlie is {α|00〉+ β|11〉}BC .
1√
2
{|00〉+ |11〉}AB ⊗ {α|00〉+ β|11〉}BC
=
1√
2
{α|0〉|00〉|0〉+ β|0〉|01〉|1〉+ α|1〉|10〉|0〉+ β|1〉|11〉|1〉}ABBC
=
1
2
√
2
{α|0〉[|φ+〉+ |φ−〉][|+〉+ |−〉] + β|0〉[|ψ+〉+ |ψ−〉][|+〉 − |−〉]
+α|1〉[|ψ+〉 − |ψ−〉][|+〉+ |−〉] + β|1〉[|φ+〉 − |φ−〉][|+〉 − |−〉]}
=
1
2
√
2
{[α|0〉+ β|1〉]|φ+〉|+〉+ [α|0〉 − β|1〉]|φ−〉|+〉+ [α|0〉 − β|1〉]|φ+〉|−〉
+[α|0〉+ β|1〉]|φ−〉|−〉+ [β|0〉+ α|1〉]|ψ+〉|+〉+ [β|0〉 − α|1〉]|ψ−〉|+〉
+[α|1〉 − β|0〉]|ψ+〉|−〉 − [α|1〉+ β|0〉]|ψ−〉|−〉} (2)
Appendix 3:
Suppose Ri is the authorized receiver sending request to Charlie and sharing a bell state
1√
2
{|00〉 + |11〉}CRi with
charlie. Suppose {α|00〉+ β|11〉}BC is shared among Bob and Charlie.
{α|00〉+ β|11〉}BC ⊗ 1√
2
{|00〉+ |11〉}CR
=
1√
2
{α|0〉|00〉|0〉+ α|0〉|01〉|1〉+ β|1〉|10〉|0〉+ β|1〉|11〉|1〉}BCCR
=
1
2
√
2
{[|+〉+ |−〉][|φ+〉+ |φ−〉]α|0〉+ [|+〉+ |−〉][|ψ+〉+ |ψ−〉]α|1〉
+[|+〉 − |−〉][|ψ+〉 − |ψ−〉]β|0〉+ [|+〉 − |−〉][|φ+〉 − |φ−〉]β|1〉}
=
1
2
√
2
{|+〉|φ+〉[α|0〉+ β|1〉] + |+〉|φ−〉[α|0〉 − β|1〉]
+|−〉|φ+〉[α|0〉 − β|1〉] + |−〉|φ−〉[α|0〉+ β|1〉] + |+〉|ψ+〉[α|1〉+ β|0〉]
+|+〉|ψ−〉[α|1〉 − β|0〉] + |−〉|ψ+〉[α|1〉 − β|0〉] + |−〉|ψ−〉[α|1〉+ β|0〉]} (3)
Appendix 4:
Suppose (A1, B1) has the shared secret {α|00〉 + β|11〉}A1sB1s as a result of bell measurement at the sender (S).
8Assume the pairs (A1, A2), (B1, B2) and (B2, R) share Bell states
1√
2
{|00〉 + |11〉}A1rA2r , 1√2{|00〉 + |11〉}B1rB2r and
1√
2
{|00〉 + |11〉}B2rR respectively. The following is a sequence of measurements that transfers the secret in shared
form from (A1, A2) to (B1, B2) so that R can be able to reconstruct it.
1. Bell Measurement at A1 on qubits A1s and A1r.
{α|00〉+ β|11〉}A1sB1s ⊗
1√
2
{|00〉+ |11〉}A1rA2r
=
1√
2
{α|00〉|00〉+ α|01〉|01〉+ β|10〉|10〉+ β|11〉|11〉}A1sA1rB1sA2r
=
1
2
{α[|φ+〉+ |φ−〉]|00〉+ α[|ψ+〉+ |ψ−〉]|01〉+ β[|ψ+〉 − |ψ−〉]|10〉+ β[|φ+〉 − |φ−〉]|11〉}A1sA1rB1sA2r
=
1
2
{|φ+〉[α|00〉+ β|11〉] + |φ−〉[α|00〉 − β|11〉] + |ψ+〉[α|01〉+ β|10〉] + |ψ−〉[α|01〉 − β|10〉]}A1sA1rB1sA2r (4)
Suppose |ψ+〉 is the outcome of this measurement, the new state of the secret will be {α|01〉+β|10〉}B1sA2s with
(B1, A2). This outcome will be sent to S classically to keep track of the present state of the secret.
2. Bell Measurement at B1 on qubits B1s and B1r.
{α|01〉+ β|10〉}B1sA2s ⊗
1√
2
{|00〉+ |11〉}B1rB2r
=
1√
2
{α|00〉|10〉+ α|01〉|11〉+ β|10〉|00〉+ β|11〉|01〉}B1sB1rA2sB2r
=
1
2
{α[|φ+〉+ |φ−〉]|10〉+ α[|ψ+〉+ |ψ−〉]|11〉+ β[|ψ+〉 − |ψ−〉]|00〉+ β[|φ+〉 − |φ−〉]|01〉}B1sB1rA2sB2r
=
1
2
{|φ+〉[α|10〉+ β|01〉] + |φ−〉[α|10〉 − β|01〉] + |ψ+〉[α|11〉+ β|00〉] + |ψ−〉[α|11〉 − β|00〉]}B1sB1rA2sB2r (5)
Suppose |φ−〉 is the outcome of this measurement, the new state of the secret will be {α|10〉−β|01〉}A2sB2s with
(A2, B2). This outcome will be sent to S classically to keep track of the present state of the secret.
